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the prior corporate receivership statute" which has no discharge pro-
vision. In the opinion of the writer the pertinent provision of the
latter statute is sufficiently inconsistent with the receivership section
of the Uniform Act to be mutually exclusive. Without the complicating
federal factor, the Uniform Business Corporations Act should be held
to repeal the antecedent receivership statute by implication.
The Federal Bankruptcy Act only suspends the operation of the
state insolvency law where Congress has pre-empted the field; there-
fore any function of the state law outside the federal scope should
not be affected. For example, the Bankruptcy Act does not cover
amounts under $i,ooo.2' The receivership-discharge provisions of the
Uniform Act, as do all statutes, have two functions: (i) the affirmative
or substantive function, and (2) the negative or repealing action upon
prior inconsistent statutes. The latter would be affected by the Bank-
ruptcy Act no more than if it had been express. Only the affirmative
function has been suspended and only as to amounts of $i,ooo or
over. Thus the rational conclusion must be that: (i) the prior cor-
porate receivership statute," subsection 5, is repealed, and (2) that
the receivership provisions of the Uniform Corporations Act2" are
suspended.
Caveat: The Washington court in the Becker case," supra, held
that a creditor's acts under the Assignment for the Benefit of Credi-
tors Act2" were "invalid" because of the discharge provision, even
though the amount concerned was under $5oo and thus without the
scope of the Bankruptcy Code. From that decision it is arguable that
the Washington court feels that federal action in this field not only
"suspends" but "invalidates" or "repeals" the offending state law, a
position which, it is submitted, is erroneous.
THE ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS IN APPELLATE BRIEFS
HAEXY R. VENABLES AND JOHN VEBLEN
INTRODUCTION
Few subjects have troubled courts more and legal writers less than
faulty assignments of error. Since the subject has received little atten-
28 REm. REV. STAT. § 741(5) [P P C. § 91-3(5)].
24 U. S. C., TrrLE II, c. 3, § 22.25 REem. REv. STAT. § 741(5) [P P C. § 91-3(5)].
20 Id., §§ 3803-48 to 3803-56 [§§ 446-1 to 446-17].
27 167 Wash. 245, 9 P.(2d) 63 (1932).
28 REM. REv. STAT. §§ 1086 to 1103 [P P C. §§ 642-1 to 642-33].
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tion outside the reports themselves, there has developed a mass of
hitherto unassimilated case authority which, because of its size, is an
obstacle rather than an aid to courts and attorneys. This article is the
product of a survey of those cases. It will add little to the general store
of information on the subject, but it is designed to do two things:
(i) call the attention of the Bar to some of the clearer and better
written discussions of the problem in the Washington cases, and (2)
to segregate, throughout the footnotes, the particular decisions dealing
with specific problems posed by the requirement that all briefs contain
an assignment of the errors relied upon for reversal.
HISTORY OF THE REQUIREMENT
Rule XXI of the Rules of the Supreme Court provides that all
briefs contain an assignment of the errors relied upon by the appellant
for reversal. The rule is placed with those rules which prescribe the
form of the brief rather than with the rules which the court treats as
jurisdictional, and, as will be shown, strict compliance with it has
never been required by the court.
It is submitted that the reason an assignment of errors has not been
considered indispensably necessary to an appeal in Washington and
the majority of the states is that a technical assignment of errors was
not essential to the transfer of causes by appeal when that procedure
was used only for equitable actions.' Historically, transfer by appeal
was a procedure adopted from the civil law whereby a complaint was
made to a higher court of an injustice or error committed by the infe-
rior court.' An appellant brought to the superior court a transcript of
the record, and the trial was merely continued there. The assignment
of error, on the other hand, was used with a writ of error, another
procedure developed in the English common law and used there for
transferring actions at law to the next higher court.' By this procedure
the party would not bring the record to the superior court for review
but would apply directly to that court for a writ directing the trial
judge to send up the record in order that an examination could be
made of the specific errors assigned.' If the party did not allege errors.
1 Smith v. Wingard, 3 Wash. Terr. 291, 13 Pac. 903 (1887), Frazier v. Venen,
3 Wash. Terr. 392, 17 Pac. 885 (1888).2 Wiscart v. Dauchy, 3 Dall. 321, (U.S. 1796), U.S. v. Goodwin, 7 Cranch 108
(U.S. 1812), Cunmngham v. Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, (1889), Buessel v. U.S. 258 Fed. 811
C.C.A. 2d, 1919).
8 Buessel v. U.S., supra, note 2.
'Siegelschiffer v. Penn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 248 Fed. 226 (C.C.A. 2d, 1917), Ward
v. Williams, 270 Ill. 547, 117 N.E. 821 (1915), Board of County Com'rs. of Hartford
County v. Jay, 122 Md. 324, 89 Atl. 715 (1914).
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the court had nothing upon which to act, and the petition was neces-
sarily denied. This limited use of the assignment of errors m the
transfer of actions at law was well understood by the judges, though
apparently not by the attorneys, of the Washington Territorial courts
as they dismissed more actions at law for want of an assignment of
errors in a period of four years than have been dismissed in the fifty-
eight years since Washington became a state.'
DISCUSSION OF THE CASES
Under the code adopted when Washington entered the Union, the
technical writ of error was dropped as a device for the transfer of
actions at law, but the assignment of error was retained and mcorpo-
rated into the new appellate procedure. Its significance there was first
explained in the case of McReavy v. Eshelman:
Respondent moves to dismiss for want of an assignment of errors. Code
Proc. sec. 1428 [substantially the same as the present Rule XXI] is the
only place where an assignment of errors is mentioned in our statutes as
they now exist. We think, inasmuch as the technical writ of error is now
obsolete in our practice, so is the technical assignment of errors. All causes
are removed to this court on appeal, and the section of the statute above
cited merely recognized the necessity of some orderly statement of gnev-
ances by the appealing party for the consideration of this court. It is a
regulation of practice which the court has emphasized by rules 7 and 12.
Opposite parties and the court look to the appellant's brief for alleged
errors, and upon finding none assigned the court would, of course, affirm
the judgment, or dismiss. But in this case, while the brief is far from being
a model in clearness and convenience of arrangement, we easily find the
points of objection, and shall not grant the motion.
Classifying the rule requiring the assignment of errors as formal
rather than jurisdictional resulted in some flagrant abuses." These
cases are of interest to us now only to the extent that they show by
implication that the courts were prepared to entertain any but the
5 Brown v. Hazard, 2 Wash. Terr. 464, 8 Pac. 494 (1885), Savage v. Maresch,
3 Wash. Terr. 259, 21 Pac. 386 (1887), Territory of Wash. ex. rel. Newlin v. Lang-
ford, 3 Wash. Terr. 276, 21 Pac. 386 (1887), Frazier v. Venen, 3 Wash. Terr. 392,
17 Pac. 885 (1888). A total of four cases was dismissed in a period of four years;
since Washington became a state, only two appeals have been dimissed for want of an
assignment of errors. Haugh v. Tacoma, 12 Wash. 386, 41 Pac. 173 (1895), Doran v.
Brown, 16 Wash. 703, 48 Pac. 251 (1897). See also Perkins v. Mitchell, Lewis &
Stayer Co., 15 Wash. 470, 46 Pac. 1039 (1896).
0 4 Wash. 757, 31 Pac. 35 (1892).
7 Haugh v. Tacoma, 12 Wash. 386, 41 Pac. 173 (1895), Doran v. Brown, 16 Wash.
703, 48 Pac. 251 (1897), Perkins v. Mitchell, Lewis & Stayer Co., 15 Wash. 470, 46
Pac. 1039 (1896).
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most completely unorgamzed and confusing briefs. Thus in Haugh v.
Tacoma' the appeal was dismissed because:
So far as appears from this brief, none of the propositions of -law to
which authorities are cited are involved in this litigation, or were ruled on
below, and the brief does not render any assistance to the court in deter-
mining what points were here for review No errors are assigned in the
brief and it cannot be determined therefrom that any of the matters therein
discussed were ever brought to the consideration of the trial court.
Petition for Rehearing-
It cannot be told from a reading of the brief what course the proceed-
ings took in the lower court, whether the cause was disposed of on demur-
rer, or, if an answer was filed, what was the nature of the defense inter-
posed by it, nor can it be told from said brief whether counsel relies for a
reversal upon errors committed by the lower court in ruling upon the
pleadings, or in receiving or rejection of testimony, or in charging the
jury
This decision points out the particular difficulties which the assign-
ment of errors was supposed to eliminate when it was incorporated into
the appeal procedure, and at the same time indicated the high degree
of informality the court would tolerate. The only other two cases in
which entire appeals were dismissed were cases of this same sort. In
general, the court has been satisfied with any form of assignment
identifying understandably and specifically the findings or rulings
which an appellant wished to challenge. The statement is not required
to be in a stilted form nor occupy a set place in the brief, as the follow-
mg example of a satisfactory form would indicate:
The appellants, on page 19 of their brief, assign errors as follows. "We
contend. (1) That there was no agreement of any kind, or at all, concluded
or entered into between Ranahan and Gibbons on the 6th of August, 1898,
or at any time before the location of the First Thought; (2) That whatever
talk was had between them was merely negotmary and amounted only to
an offer or proposition, not a contract; (3) That the talk and proposition
related only to the Shea claims, and contained nothing whatever as to
Ranahan having an interest in the future locations of Gibbons and Walker;
and (4) That the proofs do not warrant the facts found by the court."1
8 12 Wash. 386, 41 Pac. 173 (1895).
0 Perlans v. Mitchell, Lewis & Staver Co., 15 Wash. 470, 46 Pac 1039 (1896). In
this case the court heard the motion to disrmss for want of an assignment of error
before they heard the case on its merits and denied the motion. After the hearing on
the merits of the case the court held. "it is utterly impossible to determine from
the brief what the appellant relies upon for a reversal" and dismissed the case. Doran
v. Brown, 16 Wash. 703, 48 Pac. 251 (1897).
10 Ranahan v. Gibbons, 23 Wash. 255, 62 Pac. 773 (1900).
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Thus a concise statement of the questions to be reviewed was all
that was required by the court when it had a volume of business
approximating five hundred cases per annum." The most recent pro-
nouncement of the majority of the court would indicate that it has no
intention of becoming less tolerant under the pressure of the current
volume of appeals:
The general rule upon the subject of assignment of error seems to be
that, while mere arguments in an appellant's brief do not take the place
of proper assignments of error, and while there must be a substantial com-
pliance with the statutes or rules with reference thereto, nevertheless a
clear statement of the questions presented for review, pointing out the
errors for which a reversal is sought, may be treated as a sufficient assign-
ment of error.1 2
The greater danger which counsel faces today is that one of his
arguments will not be considered because it was not adequately cov-
ered by an assignment of error. While it is possible that in particular
cases the refusal of the court to decide a particular contention because
there was no assignment to cover it could be tantamount to a dismissal
of the appeal, the two situations should not be confused. As we have
seen, the question of whether the appellant is entitled to be heard at
all will depend upon whether the brief was sufficiently well-organized
and phrased to be intelligible. The question of whether a particular
argument was covered by the errors assigned will be determined by
the substantive law 's Thus where counsel assigned as error the ren-
dering of the verdict, the court refused to consider the contention that
the verdict was excessive; 4 where the appeal was prosecuted on the
ground that the court erred in finding unfair competition, the court
would not consider the contention that some of the evidence was
erroneously admitted. 5 There was no question in these cases of the
intelligibility of the arguments advanced (otherwise the court would
not have been able to distinguish them), rather the objection to these
"1 Haugh v. Tacoma, 12 Wash. 386, 41 Pac. 173 (1895).
2 In re Whittier's Estate, 126 Wash. Dec. 786, 176 P.(2d) 281 (1947).
Is In all the cases herein cited the appellant had assigned several errors and then
incorporated in his brief or oral argument additional arguments which the court
rejected. It is submitted that the reason they were rejected was that they bore no
relation to the questions of law or of fact raised by the assignments made. Williams v.
Spokane Falls & N.R.R., 39 Wash. 77, 80 Pac. 1100 (1905), Olympia Brew. Co. v.
Northwest Co., 178 Wash. 533, 35 P. (2d) 104 (1934), Walker v. Copeland, 193 Wash.
1, 74 P.(2d) 469 (1938), Kennedy v. The City of Everett, 2 Wn.(2d) 650, 99 P.(2d)
614 (1940), Sears v. Internat'l Bro. of Teamsters, 8 Wn.(2d) 447, 112 P.(2d) 850(1941), Hafer v. Marsh, 16 Wn.(2d) 175, 132 P.(2d) 1024 (1943).
'1 Williams v. Spokane Falls & N.R.R., =pra, note 13.
15 Olympia Brew Co. v. Northwest Co., supra, note 13.
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contentions was that they raised questions of law or fact not posed by
the assignments made in the brief. For example, the only relation
between the problem of whether the verdict was excessive and whether
it was erroneous is one of subject matter; both concern the verdict,
but the law involved is entirely different.
Since the reports are studded with cases where particular arguments
were not considered, the Washington Supreme Court has apparently
been more lement in allowing informal orgamzation of appellate briefs
than in permitting improper grouping of arguments." Admitting that
the distinction between these two situations is slight, it may be im-
portant. A brief that reads with the simplicity and clarity of a dime
novel may be as ineffective as the novel and as irrelevant. 17 An example
of this is the case of Brydges v. Milhionatr Club." In that case P
brought an action for unlawful detainer; D denied P's ownership of
the property and alleged that he was tenant in common with P A
demurrer to the affirmative defense for want of facts sufficient to show
ownership was sustained, then, the court specifically found that D was
a lessee and gave judgment for P On appeal D cited as error only the
order sustaining the demurrer, and under that assignment tried to
argue that he was not a lessee but a co-owner. Since the assignment
challenged only the order of the trial court, the Supreme Court
accepted the findings of fact (i.e. that he was a lessee) and then,
inevitably, affirmed the order sustaining the demurrer. While D's initial
20Dearborn Foundry Co. v. Augustine, 5 Wash. 67, 31 Pac. 327 (1892), Blumen-
thal v. Pacific Meat Co. 12 Wash. 331, 41 Pac. 47 (1895), Sengfelder v. Hill, 21 Wash.
371, 47 Pac. 757 (1899), State v. Jensen 194 Wash. 515, 78 P.(2d) 600 (1938),
Blouen v. Quimpere Canning Co., 139 Wash. 436, 247 Pac. 940 (1926), Goebel v.
Elliott, 178 Wash. 444, 35 P.(2d) 44 (1937), State v. Elwood, 193 Wash. 514, 76
P.(2d) 985 (1939), Klein v. Zeeve, 199 Wash. 644, 92 P.(2d) 877 (1939), for
additional cases see note 13.17 There is an exception to the broad generalization when the appellant has relied
on only one error of the lower court. The Supreme Court has consistently declined to
dismiss such cases for the reason that a formal assignment of error would add nothing
to the clarity of the brief. One Justice of the present court does not believe such an
exception should exist. His views are set forth in dissenting opinions to In re Whit-
tier's Estate, 126 Wash. Dec. 786, 176 P. (2d) 281 (1947) and Dill v. Zielke, 126 Wash.
Dec. 233, 173 P.(2d) 977 (1946). The writers are of the opinion that agreeing with the
propositions advanced in those dissents would necessitate ignoring the history of the
development of the assignment of errors, its purpose in the appellate procedure, and
the following precedents: Goetzinger v. Rosenfield, 16 Wash. 392, 47 Pac. 882 (1897),
Rowe v. Northport Smelting Co., 35 Wash. 101, 76 Pac. 529 (1904), Moore v. The
City of Spokane, 88 Wash. 203, 152 Pac. 999 (1915), O'Leary v. Bennett, 190 Wash.
115, 66 P.(2d) 875 (1937), State v. Lowe, 192 Wash. 631, 74 P.(2d) 458 (1937,
Walker v. Copeland, 193 Wash. 1, 74 P.(2d) 469 (1937), Bobst v. Hardisty, 199,
Wash. 304, 91 P.(2d) 567 (1939), Ernst v. Guarantee Millwork, Inc., 200 Wash. 195,
93 P.(2d) 404 (1939), State ex. rot. Rand v. Seattle, 13 Wn.(2d) 107, 124 P.(2d)
207 (1942), Dill v. Zielke, ibid., In re Whittier's Estate, ibid.
18 15 Wn.(2d) 714, 132 P.(2d) 188 (1942).
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
error was in setting up as an affirmative defense matter which could
properly have been raised under a general denial, the effect of group-
ing, for the purposes of assignment of error, the arguments against the
court's finding with the arguments against the ruling of the court
deprived him of what was probably his only defense.
There remain several special aspects of the requirement of an assign-
ment of errors that should be noted. The rule was laid down in Le Cocq
Motors, Inc. v. Whatcom County" that an assignment of errors as to
conclusions of law does not bring up for review the finding of facts
upon which the conclusions are based. This rule may be particularly
troublesome since the recent case of Hansen v. Lrndsell20 held that the
absence of a specific assignment of error would preclude the courts
from going behind an implied finding of fact as well.
Abandoned or unsupported assignments will be disregarded by the
court. An assignment will be considered abandoned when the court
finds that there is no argument in the brief to amplify it and will be
rejected as unsupported when the record brought up does not cover
entirely the matter assigned as error." These grounds for rejection are
so obvious that they need no discussion.
Finally it is to be noted that an assignment is not necessary at all to
challenge a jurisdictional error which is an error apparent on the face
of the record,2 and the same is true of the objection that the special
findings of fact by the trial court are insufficient to support the judg-
ment, or that the findings are too conflicting or uncertain to support the
judgment.2" These exceptions are fundamental to our system of plead-
ing and procedure and are the ones incorporated into Rule XXI by
the proviso:
That the objection that the lower court had no jurisdiction of the cause
or that the complaint does not state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of
action, or that the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction of the appeal, may be
taken at any time. 24
194 Wn.(2d) 601, 104 P.(2d) 475 (1940).
20 14 Wn.(2d) 643, 129 P.(2d) 234 (1942).
21 Moheny v. Davis, 104 Wash. 209, 176 Pac. 31 (1918), Wesfield v. Seattle, 180
Wash. 288, 40 P.(2d) 149 (1935), Bond v. Werley, 175 Wash. 659, 28 P.(2d) 318.
All these cases were fairly early; it is submitted that the court now ignores such
assignments without mentioning them in the written decisions.
22 Green v. Langnes, 177 Wash. 536, 32 P.(2d) 565 (1934).
28 Hansen v. Lindell, 14 Wn.(2d) 643, 129 P.(2d) 234 (1942).
24 Hansen v. Lindell, supra, note 23.
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CONCLUSIONS
Thus the requirement that all briefs contain an assignment of the
errors relied on for reversal resolves itself into two distinct problems.
The first is organizing and phrasing the entire brief in a clear and
intelligible style. It is not a legal problem, but rather one of compo-
sition. The second relates to the phrasing of specific assignments so
that they cover the particular arguments the appellant intends to make.
The courts have formulated only two rules to guide attorneys in phras-
ing their assignments: (i) assignments as to conclusions of law do not
bring up for review the finding of facts upon which the conclusions
are based; (2) jurisdictional errors may be argued without prior
assignment. Obviously these two rules do not cover all possible defects
or inadequacies that could be found in different assignments, but it
should be emphasized that it is only with regard to the requirement of
clarity that the court has practiced the liberality it preaches. While the
inadequacy of a particular assignment is rarely discussed by the court,
the decided cases often contain the comment, "Arguments not covered
by the assignments of error were not considered."
In practice the court hears appeals on their merits in spite of deft-
ciencies in logical assignments of error, but limits the "merits" to those
questions of law or fact which the appellant sufficiently understands
to be able to identify and point out. It is submitted that this is an
intelligent compromise between the interest of efficiency in a court with
a crowded calendar and the right of every man with a just cause to be
heard. It provides adequate protection for the respondent and the
maximum insurance of justice in the decisions of the appellate courts.
